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This paper studies optimal monetary policy with the nominal interest rate
as the single policy instrument in an economy, where firms set prices in a stag-
gered way without indexation and real money balances contribute separately to
households’ utility. The optimal deterministic steady state under commitment
is the Friedman rule – even if the importance assigned to the utility of money
is small relative to consumption and leisure. We approximate the model around
the optimal steady state as the long-run policy target. Optimal monetary policy
is characterized by stabilization of the nominal interest rate instead of inflation
stabilization as the predominant principle.
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1 Introduction
What is the primary aim of optimal monetary policy? In the existing literature there
are two major views that deliver opposite recommendations for the optimal conduct
of monetary policy in the short and in the long run. The first branch goes back to
Friedman (1969) and evaluates monetary policy in the long run with fully flexible prices
and under perfect competition. In order to equate the private opportunity costs for
holding money to the zero social costs to produce it, the nominal interest rate should
be zero. The other view considers optimal monetary policy in the short run in the
presence of nominal rigidities and imperfect competition (e.g. Woodford, 2003a, ch.6-8;
Benigno and Woodford, 2005; Khan et al., 2003; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004, 2005).
A key feature of this literature is that the authors consider small fluctuations around
the (almost) zero inflation steady state, implying that optimal policy nearly completely
offsets the distortions due to price dispersion – even in the presence of a monetary
friction. The predominant principle is inflation stabilization, while the nominal interest
rate should adjust relatively freely to support this principle (Woodford, 2003a).
In this paper we revisit the issue of optimal monetary policy in a sticky price model
in the presence of a transaction friction. The foremost contribution is to challenge
the conventional view that the Friedman rule loses out to the goal of price stability
once price stickiness is introduced. We show that the widely used money-in-the utility
function model (MIU) implies that Friedman’s rule is optimal even when large amounts
of price stickiness are present. This is in contrast to the key message of papers such
as Woodford (2003a), Khan, King and Wolman (2003) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2004, 2005) and others. Second, we find that the primary aim of optimal policy in the
short run is to stabilize the nominal interest rate instead of inflation.
Our analysis is set in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with imperfect
competition and Calvo’s staggered price setting (1983) without indexation. A trans-
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action friction is introduced via the textbook money-in-the-utility-function approach
(Sidrauski, 1967; Woodford, 2003a; Walsh, 2003) with consumption and real money
balances entering in a separable way. Assuming that the government has access to
lump-sum taxes, we focus on optimal monetary policy that relies on the risk-free nom-
inal interest rate as the single policy instrument. Since we allow for the existence of an
output subsidy that offsets the distortion created by monopolistic competition, the pol-
icy maker faces two distortions: price dispersion due to staggered price setting calls for
an optimal inflation of zero, implying costs of money holdings. However, the monetary
distortion can only be offset by setting the nominal interest rate to zero.
We determine the optimal deterministic steady state under commitment as the
optimal long-run target of monetary policy.1 Remarkably, we find that even for very
low values for the weight of money in the utility function relative to consumption and
leisure, it is optimal to fully offset the monetary distortion and to allow for a small degree
of price dispersion. I.e. the Friedman rule is optimal even in the presence of Calvo-style
staggered price setting. This result holds for wide a range of parameter values including
low weights for real money balances in the utility function. To understand this finding,
note that the welfare cost of price dispersion arising from long-run deflation required
by the Friedman rule is small relative to the loss from a positive nominal interest rate.
While the welfare loss due to price dispersion hinges primarily on the frequency of
price adjustment, the utility losses of a positive interest rate crucially depends on the
sensitivity of money demand to the nominal interest rate. In an MIU framework, the
latter increases strongly as interest rates fall. Thereby, the taxation of money holdings
via a positive interest rate becomes suboptimal.
We linearize the model around the optimal steady state under commitment as the
long-run optimal policy target and derive a quadratic approximation to the utility of
1To be more precise, we consider policies that are optimal from a timeless perspective (Woodford,
2003a).
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the representative household as the objective of the central bank. This welfare based
loss-function depends on three arguments: the unconditional variances of inflation, the
output gap, and on the variance of the nominal interest rate. While the weight for the
variation in the output gap relative to inflation depends exclusively on deep parameters,
the relative weight for interest rate variability hinges on steady state values, too. Re-
markably, the preference to stabilize fluctuations in the nominal interest rate increases
as optimal inflation moves towards Friedman’s rule of deflation. This increase is pri-
marily driven by the rise in the interest elasticity of money demand. Correspondingly,
the importance to account for monetary frictions depends upon the steady state chosen
for approximation: The long-run optimal policy is key for optimal policy reactions in
the short run. Since we approximate our model around a steady state implied by the
Friedman rule, the primary goal of optimal monetary policy is to stabilize variations
in the interest rate rather than in inflation. Given the high weight attached to interest
rate stabilization, optimal monetary policy requires abstaining from fluctuations in the
nominal interest rate. Instead, the nominal interest rate is literally fixed in response to
various kinds of disturbances. In that sense, the observation that central banks keep
the main refinancing rate constant over a long time horizon, e.g. the European Central
Bank from June until December 2005, can be interpreted as optimal policy according
to Friedman’s rule – even if the state of the economy has changed.
We show that choosing a long-run deflation target according to the Friedman rule
does not generally undermine the central banks ability to stabilize the welfare rele-
vant fluctuations around that target. On the contrary, the welfare loss arising from
fluctuations around the Friedman steady state can be lower than the loss arising from
fluctuations around the zero inflation steady state. Overall, we find support for the
Friedman rule even in case of a reasonable amount of nominal rigidity due to staggered
price setting a la Calvo: The Friedman rule yields higher steady state utility and can
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also improve welfare effects of fluctuations around the steady state compared to price
stability.
Regarding the lower bound on the nominal interest rate, we find that this is not a
concern for central banks in our model. We assume that the zero bound on interest rates
is not binding in expectations, i.e. the average gross nominal interest rate must be at
least slightly larger than unity. While this assumption does not exclude the possibility
of an occasionally binding constraint, the probability for this to occur is virtually zero.
The standard deviation of the nominal interest rate under optimal policy is so small
relative to the buffer between the steady state nominal rate and unity, that the lower
bound essentially never becomes binding.
Related Literature
We now turn to the related literature. Most closely related to our paper is the work
by Woodford (2003a, Chapter 6-7; Woodford, 2003b) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2005). Woodford also studies optimal monetary policy in a money-in-the-utility func-
tion framework with staggered price setting. In contrast to our analysis, the model
is log-linearized around the zero inflation steady state without computing the optimal
steady state in a first step. This approximation point then implies very different dy-
namics for the nominal interest rate. In his analysis, the nominal interest rate reacts
rather sharply to shocks while the optimal path of inflation is relatively smooth over the
cycle (see Woodford, 2003a: 504). Our contribution is to show that the optimal policy
prescriptions differ substantially once one takes into account the interactions between
long run and short run optimal policy.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) and Khan et al. (2003) also analyze optimal mon-
etary policy with nominal rigidities and a monetary friction. These papers adopt a
transaction technology approach to introducing money into the model. While Khan
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(2003) use a different time dependent pricing model than we do, the economic envi-
ronment of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) is more similar to our framework. They
analyze a medium scale model with staggered price setting a la Calvo and various ad-
ditional distortions. They find that the central bank should aim at price stability and
stabilization of inflation as the main principle. The difference between their key finding
and our results is explained as follows. The money-in-the-utility function approach we
employ has different implications for money demand at low interest rates compared to
the transactions technology in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe. The MIU framework implies
that the interest-elasticity of money demand increases by large amounts as the nominal
interest rate approaches the lower bound. Correspondingly, welfare costs of positive
interest rates increase substantially. This is not the case for their transaction cost tech-
nology. Our contribution is to show that both the degree of price dispersion, as well as
the sensitivity of money demand with respect to nominal interest rates at low levels,
are decisive for the conduct of optimal policy.
Methodologically, this paper differs from Khan et al. (2003) and Schmitt-Grohé
(2005) by working with the linear-quadratic framework, rather than with the time in-
variant Ramsey approach. By showing that the weight on nominal interest stabilization
in the loss function depends on the steady state values under control of the central bank,
this approach helps to point out intuitively how long run optimal policy and short run
stabilization policies are interrelated. In addition, the guiding principle of optimal mon-
etary policy is directly transparent in the size of the relative weights to stabilize the
nominal interest rate, inflation, and the output gap.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we set up the model.
In section 3 we compute the optimal steady state under commitment and derive a
quadratic approximation of the utility of the representative household. In section 4
we derive the optimal monetary policy responses in the short run for 2 policy regimes:
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the first one has Friedman’s Rule, and the other one has zero inflation as its long-run
target. The last section concludes.
2 The model
We consider an economy that consists of a continuum of infinitely lived households
indexed with j ∈ [0, 1]. It is assumed that households have identical initial asset
endowments and identical preferences. Household j acts as a monopolistic supplier of
labor services lj. Lower (upper) case letters denote real (nominal) variables. At the
beginning of period t, households’ financial wealth comprises money Mjt−1, a portfolio
of state contingent claims on other households yielding a (random) payment Zjt, and
one period nominally non-state contingent government bonds Bjt−1 carried over from
the previous period. Assuming complete financial markets let qt,t+1 denote the period
t price of one unit of currency in a particular state of period t + 1 normalized by the
probability of occurrence of that state, conditional on the information available in period
t. Then, the price of a random payoff Zt+1 in period t + 1 is given by Et[qt,t+1Zjt+1].






where ct denotes a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of consumption with elasticity of substitution
θ, Pt the aggregate price level, wjt the real wage rate for labor services ljt of type j,
Tt a lump-sum tax, Rt the gross nominal interest rate on government bonds, and Dit
dividends of monopolistically competitive firms. Further, households have to fulfill the
no-Ponzi game condition, limi→∞ Etqt,t+i(Mjt+i + Bjt+i + Zjt+1+i) ≥ 0. The objective
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βt{u(cjt, ζt)− v(ljt) + z(Mjt/Pt)}, β ∈ (0, 1), (2)
where β denotes the subjective discount factor and Mjt/Pt = mjt end-of-period real
money balances. Note that our specification of utility is consistent with recent findings
by Andrés, López-Salido and Vallés (2006) for the Euro area and by Ireland (2004) for
the US. They estimate the role of money for the business cycle of the Euro area and
the US and find that preferences are separable between consumption and real money
balances.
We assume that households’ utility can be affected by a disturbance term ζt with
mean 1 that can alter the utility of consumption. To avoid additional complexities, we
set ucζ = uc at the deterministic steady state. For each value of ζ, the instantaneous
utility function is assumed to be non-decreasing in consumption and real balances,
decreasing in labor time, strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable, and to
fulfill the Inada conditions. We assume that z(mjt) implies satiation in real money
balances at a finite positive level. The derivatives zm, zmm have finite limiting values as
m approaches the satiation level from below. In particular, the limiting value of zmm
from below is negative (see Woodford, 2003a, Assumption 6.1).
Households are wage-setters supplying differentiated types of labor lj which are







jt dj. We assume that the
elasticity of substitution between different types of labor, εt > 1, varies exogenously over
time. The time variation in this markup parameter introduces a so called cost-push
shock into the model that gives rise to a stabilization problem for the central bank. Cost
minimization implies that the demand for differentiated labor services ljt, is given by
ljt = (wjt/wt)







Maximizing (2) subject to (1) and the no-Ponzi game condition for given initial values
Mt0−1 > 0, Z0, Bt0−1, and Rt0−1 ≥ 0 leads to the following first order conditions
for consumption, money, the real wage rate for labor type j, government bonds, and
contingent claims:
λjt = uc(cjt, ζt), vl(ljt) = wjtλjt/µ
w
t , (3)









where λjt denotes a Lagrange multiplier, πt the inflation rate πt = Pt/Pt−1, and µwt =
εt/(εt−1) the stochastic wage mark-up with mean µ̄w > 1. The first order condition for
contingent claims holds for each state in period t+1, and determines the price of one unit
of currency for a particular state at time t+1 normalized by the conditional probability
of occurrence of that state in units of currency in period t. Arbitrage-freeness between
government bonds and contingent claims requires Rt = 1/Etqt,t+1. The optimum is
further characterized by the budget constraint (1) holding with equality and by the
transversality condition limi→∞ Etβiλjt+i(Mjt+i + Bjt+i + Zjt+1+i)/Pjt+i = 0.
The final consumption good Yt is an aggregate of differentiated goods produced









it di, with θ > 1. Let Pit and Pt denote the price of good i set by firm i and the price
index for the final good. The demand for each differentiated good is ydit = (Pit/Pt)
−θ yt,
with P 1−θt =
∫ 1
0
P 1−θit di. A firm i produces good yi using a technology that is linear in






εt/(εt−1): yit = atlit, where lt =
∫ 1
0
litdi and at is a
productivity shock with mean 1.
Labor demand satisfies: mcit = wt/at, where mcit = mct denotes real marginal costs
independent of the quantity that is produced by the firm.
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We allow for a nominal rigidity in form of a staggered price setting as developed
by Calvo (1983). Each period firms may reset their prices with the probability 1 − α
independently of the time elapsed since the last price setting. The fraction α ∈ [0, 1) of
firms are assumed to keep their previous period’s prices, Pit = Pit−1, i.e. indexation is
absent. Firms are assumed to maximize their market value, which equals the expected
sum of discounted dividends Et
∑∞
T=t qt,T DiT , where Dit ≡ Pityit(1− τ)−Ptmctyit and
we used that firms also have access to contingent claims. Here, τ denotes an exogenous
sales tax introduced to offset the inefficiency of steady state output due to markup
pricing (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). In each period a measure 1−α of randomly
selected firms set new prices P̃it as the solution to max ePit Et
∑∞
T=t α
T−tqt,T (P̃ityiT (1 −
τ) − PT mcT yiT ), s.t. yiT = (P̃it)−θP θT yT . The first order condition for the price of





































−θdi ≥ 1 and thus
∆t = (1 − α)(P̃t/Pt)−θ + απθt ∆t−1. The dispersion measure ∆t captures the welfare
decreasing effects of staggered price setting. If prices are flexible, α = 0, then the first
order condition for the optimal price of the differentiated good reads: mct = (1−τ) θ−1θ .
The public sector consists of a fiscal and a monetary authority. The central bank as
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the monetary authority is assumed to control the short-term interest rate Rt. The fiscal
authority issues risk-free one period bonds, has to finance exogenous government expen-
ditures PtGt, receives lump-sum taxes from households, transfers from the monetary au-
thority, and tax-income from an exogenous given constant sales tax τ , such that the con-




The exogenous government expenditures Gt evolve around a mean Ḡ, which is restricted
to be a constant fraction of output, Ḡ = ȳ(1 − sc). We assume that tax policy guar-




t+v = 0. Due to
the existence of the lump-sum tax, we consider only the demand effect of government
expenditures and focus exclusively on optimal monetary policy.
We collect the exogenous disturbances in the vector ξt = [ζt, at, Gt, µ
w
t ]. It is as-
sumed that the percentage deviation of each of the elements of the vector from their
means evolve according to autonomous AR(1)-processes with autocorrelation coeffi-
cients ρζ , ρa, ρG, ρµ ∈ [0, 1). The innovations are assumed to be i.i.d..
The recursive equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1 Given initial values, Mt0−1 > 0, Pt0−1 > 0 and ∆t0−1 ≥ 0, a monetary
policy and a ricardian fiscal policy Tt ∀ t ≥ t0, a sales tax τ , a rational expectations
equilibrium (REE) for Rt ≥ 1, is a set of sequences {yt, ct, lt, mct, ∆t, Pt, P̃it, mt,





t−1 + (1 − α)P̃ 1−θt , the households’ first order conditions uc(yt −
Gt, ζt)wt = vl(lt)µ
w
t , uc(yt − Gt, ζt)/Pt = βRtEtuc(yt+1 − Gt+1, ζt+1)/Pt+1, zm(mt) =
uc(yt −Gt, ζt)(Rt − 1)/Rt, the aggregate resource constraint yt = lt/∆t, clearing of the
goods market ct + Gt = yt and the transversality condition, for {ξt}∞t=t0.
We will address the issue of the lower bound in the following way. First, we compute
the optimal steady state under the assumption that the expected nominal interest rate
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is positive. This is equivalent to a postulated expected inflation rate slightly larger
than the discount factor, Eπt ≥ β + ε, with ε as a small positive scalar. Then we
approximate our model around the optimal steady state given a value for ε and solve
for the optimal policy outcome in the short run. Computing the unconditional variance
for the nominal interest rate allows us to quantify the probability – in case of a shock
– that the nominal interest rate will reach the lower bound for a particular ε-steady
state.
3 The Linear-Quadratic Optimal Policy Problem
In a first step we compute the steady state that is “optimal from a timeless perspective”
(Woodford, 2003a). I.e. we assume that at t = t0 the central bank has been in charge
for an infinite number of periods and that it respects commitments made in the past.
This optimal steady state is our point of expansion for the log-linear approximation of
the model’s equilibrium conditions as well as for the derivation of the purely quadratic
welfare measure. As we will see, long run and short run optimal policy are closely
interrelated. Throughout we assume that the steady state is rendered efficient by an
appropriate setting of the tax rate.
3.1 The Optimal Steady State
In this section we compute the optimal steady state under commitment. Since we
consider policies that are optimal from a timeless perspective, the associated optimality
conditions will be time invariant which marks the difference to a standard commitment
approach. In particular, the optimality conditions in the initial period do not differ
from those in later periods. The nonlinear optimization problem for the central bank is
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to maximize the utility of the representative household through choice of output, the
dispersion measure, inflation, the nominal interest rate and the denominator (Kt) and




βt−t0{u(yt −Gt, ζt)− v(∆tyt/at) + z(m(Rt, yt −Gt, ζt))}, (8)
subject to the firms’ optimal pricing condition, the recursive formulation of the functions





θ − 1Ft (9)






∆t = (1− α)ρ(πt)
θ
θ−1 + α∆t−1πθt (12)
and
uc(yt −Gt, ζt) = βRtEt uc(yt+1 −Gt+1, ζt+1)
πt+1
, (13)
with ρ(πt) ≡ (1− απθ−1t )(1− α)−1. In addition, optimality from a timeless perspective
requires a certain degree of of prior commitment. The optimum can be described by
the constraints (9)-(13) and the first order necessary conditions for the choice of yt, ∆t,
Kt, Ft, Rt and πt (details see appendix 6.1).
To simplify the analysis and to solve for the optimal steady numerically, we assume
that households’ utility is given by the usual CRRA specification:
c1−σc





1− σm , (14)
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σc, σm positive and ω non-negative. Here, a1 ≥ 0 denotes the weight for the util-
ity stemming from real money balances relative to the utility of consumption and a2
the corresponding relative weight for the disutility of labor.2 As mentioned above we
assume that the zero-bound on the interest rate is not binding in expectations. In the
deterministic steady state this is equivalent to assuming that expected inflation is at
least Eπt ≥ β + ε. The reason for this assumption is twofold. Economically, the result-
ing buffer allows the central bank to adjust its instrument downward as response to a
shock (at least to a small amount). Technically, the CRRA preferences do not display
a satiation point for real money balances at a finite level. However, by imposing a
lower bound on the nominal interest defined by the small parameter ε > 0, real money
balances are still bounded – even if inflation equals β + ε. The derivatives zm and zmm
exhibit finite limiting values as real money balances approach the level associated with
the ε lower bound from below.
σc σm ω β a1 a2 sc = c̄/ȳ µ̄
w θ α ε
2 2.5 0.5 0.99 1/99 25 0.8 7/6 6 0.66 0.0001
Table 1: Baseline calibration
In our baseline calibration we set θ = 6 and α = 0.66, where the latter can be found
for example in Walsh (2005) or Woodford (2003a). The parameter a2 is set such that
agents work 1/3 of their available time in the steady state.
We calibrate the money demand block of our model to be in line with the existing
literature and U.S. times series data. In particular, we set the annual interest semi-
elasticity of money demand, ∂ log m/∂R = −[R(R−1)σm]−1 equal to - 4.47 at an annual
interest rate of R = 1.083. This is in line with Lucas (2000) and Woodford (2003a). In
calibrating this elasticity we have assumed an average annual inflation rate of 4 per cent
2The first conditions and the constraints of the Ramsey problem in the deterministic steady state
for the assumed CRRA preferences can be found in appendix 6.3.
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together with a real interest rate of 4.3 per cent such that R = 1.083. It then follows
that σm = 2.5. Note that the semi-elasticity and the elasticity of money demand,
ηR(R) ≡ [(R − 1)σm]−1 > 0, increases (in absolute terms) as interest rates decrease.3
We assume a degree of relative risk aversion σc = 2. This implies an output elasticity
of money demand σc/(scσm) = 1. Furthermore, we set the parameter a1 = 1/99 such
that at a nominal interest rate of R = 1.083 the annual ratio of M1 over nominal GDP
equals 0.2. This value is consistent with postwar U.S. data and similar to the one used
by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004, 2005).
Then the following numerical result for the ε steady state holds:
Result 1 (Optimal Steady State) If a1 ≥ 1/3513 and the other parameters are
given by the baseline calibration, optimal inflation in the deterministic steady state
π is β + ε = 0.9901. The associated optimal price dispersion ∆̄ is 1.0014, while the
optimal nominal interest rate R̄ is 1.0001 > 1.
Details of the computation can be found in appendix 6.2.4 Under the baseline calibra-
tion, we find that the optimal steady value for inflation is the lower bound, π = β + ε,
i.e. it involves deflation. Correspondingly, the nominal interest rate is almost zero.
We obtain this result even if when assuming a low weight for the utility of real money
balances. Basically, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004, 2005) and Khan et al. (2003) find
that the optimal inflation rate is close but not identical to unity, where the welfare
function has slope zero, the interior solution (see Figure 1). In this steady state, the
predominant aim of policy is to minimize price dispersion. However, if the weight as-
signed to the utility of real money balances is large enough – larger than 1/3513 – this
3Note that this is not due to the fact that we use a separable MIU formulation. In case of a
non-separable MIU specification, u(c, m); ucm > 0, which is equivalent to a shopping-time or real
resource costs of transactions model (Feenstra, 1986), the corresponding elasticity becomes ηR(R) =
[(R− 1)(σm + εcm)]−1, εcm = ucmm/uc.
4To simplify the notation, steady state values in the following are denoted without a time subscript.
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Figure 1: Welfare and Inflation in the steady state
optimum becomes a local maximum only, while the global optimum is the Friedman
Rule.
Since a1 is an unobserved preference parameter, it is difficult to assess whether the
critical value a1 = 1/3513 implies a large or small role for money in the utility function.
However, the annual steady state ratio of M1 over nominal GDP implied by this critical
value is 0.048. Hence, even if the importance of money in transactions - as measured
by this ratio - falls by 76% from its baseline value of 0.2, the Friedman rule would still
be optimal. Therefore, the Friedman rule is optimal in our model even when money
provides a very small flow of utility.
Why does the Friedman rule turn out to be optimal even when the importance of
real money balances in the utility function is very low? Optimal monetary policy seeks
to minimize two distortions created by price dispersion and the transaction friction,
since the monopolistic distortion is eliminated by an output subsidy.5 Price dispersion
5The output subsidy of τ = 1− (1− αβπθ−1)µwθρ(π)1/(θ−1)[(1− αβπθ)(θ − 1)]−1 < 0 depends on
steady state deflation. However, this feature does not favor the Friedman Rule in the steady state. If
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calls for an inflation rate of zero, while the monetary friction requires deflation. Corre-
spondingly, we expect our optimal gross inflation rate to be found between β and unity.
First, while studies such as Kiley (2002) and Ascari (2004) have shown that relatively
small amounts of trend inflation are associated with relatively large welfare costs under
Calvo pricing, this is not the case for long run deflation. Figure 4 in the appendix
shows that the price dispersion arising from long run deflation is relatively small. The
second reason for the optimality of Friedman’s rule is an adaption of a general principle
of optimal taxation in public finance. Since the interest rate acts like a tax on money
holdings, it should be low due to the fact that money demand is elastic with respect to
interest under price stability.
While the choice for ε is arbitrary, our results are not very sensitive to the magnitude
of ε (see Figure 5 in the appendix). The graph plots optimal annual inflation against
the degree of price dispersion α. Remarkably, our threshold levels for the optimality
of Friedman’s rule differ substantially from the results obtained by Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2005, Figure 1). While the Friedman rule in our model is optimal until the
degree of price dispersion is below 0.81, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe find a considerably
lower breaking point of approximately 0.46 (see the vertical line in Figure 5), since the
welfare costs of positive interest rates are lower in their transaction costs specification.
Which parameters influence the lower bound on a1, i.e. the minimum weight for
money in the utility function that renders the Friedman rule optimal? Put differently,
which structural features work in favor for the Friedman rule and when does price dis-
persion become the main focus of monetary policy? To gain intuition for this question,
we compare the outcomes of the Friedman rule and a zero inflation policy and derive an
we were to apply the subsidy under zero-inflation, τ = 1− µwθ/(θ − 1), the Friedman Rule would be
optimal for even smaller relative weights of money in the utility function. The reason is as follows.
First, note that steady state output is lower when the subsidy does not depend on trend deflation.
Note further that the utility loss that households suffer due to a positive steady state price dispersion
is weighted with the steady state output.
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analytical expression of the threshold for which the former dominates the latter policy.
Proposition 1 (Friedman’s Rule and Zero Inflation) Assume that preferences are
of the separable CRRA type and logarithmic, σm = σc = 1, and a2 = 1. Then the Fried-
man Rule steady state, πFR = β + ε, yields higher utility than the zero inflation steady
state, πZERO = 1, if and only if






ln[RFRηR,FR(RZEROηR,ZERO)−1]− ω/(1 + ω) ln[∆FR]
with ∆FR as the price dispersion associated with π = β+ε and RFRηR,FR(RZEROηR,ZERO)
−1 =
(1− β)(1 + β−1ε)/β−1ε.
Proof see appendix 6.4.
RZERO = β
−1 and RFR = 1 + β−1ε denote the gross nominal interest rate under zero
inflation and Friedman’s rule. Evidently, the Friedman rule performs better than a zero
inflation regime, when the degree of price dispersion associated with the Friedman rule,
∆FR is small. But at least equally important is the sensitivity of money demand with
respect to interest rates under Friedman’s rule, ηR,FR, compared to the corresponding
elasticity if zero inflation applies, ηR,ZERO. If these elasticities differ substantially,
the amount and utility of real money balances in both regimes differs too. As will
become clear below, this elasticity heavily influences the possible welfare losses due
to positive interest rates. Furthermore, a large fraction of private consumption, sc,
favors the Friedman rule. The intuition is as follows. Consider a value for a1 such that
the Friedman rule delivers the same steady state welfare as the zero inflation policy.
If the fraction of government expenditures decreases, people have to work less since
less output has to be produced. Due to price dispersion, people work more under the
Friedman Rule, such that their marginal disutility of labor is always higher than under
the zero inflation regime. Correspondingly, a one percent decrease in labor in both
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regimes leads to relatively larger utility gains in the Friedman Rule regime.
It is important to point out that the Friedman rule is optimal only under com-
mitment, but never under discretion. The intuition for this result is that the nominal
interest rate as the opportunity cost of money holdings depends on expected inflation.
When the central bank acts under discretion, it cannot influence inflation expectations.
Hence, the Friedman rule is not optimal under discretion. To see this more formally,
consider the optimality condition of the planner’s choice for inflation in the determin-














Here, the multipliers λ4 > 0 and λ5 > 0 measure the severeness of price dispersion and
the transaction friction in terms of utility. A necessary requirement for the Friedman
rule to qualify as an optimum is that (15) is non-positive for π → β. Otherwise, it is
always possible to increase welfare by increasing inflation. Therefore, a high value of
λ5 relative to λ4 for all inflation rates between β and 1 favors the lower bound as the
optimum. While λ4 is mainly driven by the degree of price stickyness α, λ5 crucially
depends on the elasticity of money demand with respect to the nominal interest rate,
λ5 = mzmηR. In order not to distort behavior money holdings should not be taxed
with positive interest rates if they are demanded elastically. Note that this reasoning is
based on an expectation argument, which does not arise if the central bank acts under
discretion. In that case, the central bank does not consider the impact of its actions on









θ−1 − αθπθ−1∆], (16)
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is not affected by the multiplier λ5, i.e. by considerations that seek to eliminate the
monetary distortion. Under discretion, the multiplier λ5 does not appear since it is
associated with future inflation. Correspondingly, the following proposition states that
under discretion the Friedman rule is not optimal in our economy – independent of the
size of the relative weight for the utility of real money balances.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Steady State under Discretion) Consider the optimiza-
tion under discretion and suppose that a1 and sc are finite. If the preferences are of
the separable CRRA type and σcsc
−1 ≥ 1, then the Friedman Rule is not optimal in the
deterministic steady state.
Proof see appendix 6.5.
In the following subsection we consider optimal monetary policy in the short run, as-
suming the baseline calibration, such that β + ε is the optimal inflation rate from a
timeless perspective.
3.2 Approximating the model around the optimal steady state
The model is log-linearized around the optimal deterministic steady state π = β+ε < 1,
i.e. under trend deflation and closely follows the approximation around trend inflation
(Ascari, 2004). The rational expectations equilibrium for the log-linear-approximate
model is then a set of sequences {ŷt, π̂t, m̂t, R̂t, F̂t}∞t=t0 consistent with the following set
of equilibrium conditions6




(ŷt − gt)− ηR,FRR̂t, (18)
6The derivation of the aggregate supply curve can be found in appendix 6.6.
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π̂t = βEtπ̂t+1 + κ
∗(ω + σ)(ŷt − ŷzt ) +
κ∗(π̄ − 1)
1− αβπθ [(σ − 1)ŷt + F̂t] (19)
F̂t = (1− αβπθ)[(1 + ω)ŷt + µ̂wt − (1 + ω)ât)] + αβπθEt(θπ̂t+1 + F̂t+1), (20)
where ηR,FR = [σm(RFR − 1)]−1, sc = c/y, σc = −uccc/ucc > 0, σ = σcsc−1, ω =
vlll/vl > 0, gt = (Gt − G)/y + σ−1ζ̂t, κ∗ = (1 − απθ−1)(1 − βαπθ)/(απθ), disturbances
are collected in ŷzt = ((1 + ω)ât + σgt − µ̂wt )/(ω + σ), σm = −zmm(m̄)m̄/zm(m̄) >
0, the transversality condition, for a monetary policy, a sequence {ξ̂t}∞t=t0 , and given
initial values Mt0−1 and Pt0−1. Further ẑt denotes the percent deviation of a generic
variable zt from its steady state value z. In addition we assume that the bounds on the
fluctuations of the shock vector ‖ log ξt‖ are sufficiently tight, such that ξt remains in
the neighborhood of its steady state value.
3.3 The Quadratic Policy Objective
In this section we derive a purely quadratic welfare measure for the utility of the average
household as the relevant objective for optimal monetary policy in the short run.
We assume that the welfare-relevant objective is the expected and discounted aver-







v(ljt)dj + z(Mt/Pt)}. (21)
Our aim is to derive a quadratic loss function that yields an accurate second order
approximation of the average utility of all households. We seek to evaluate the ap-
proximated level of utility by using the log-linearized conditions (17)-(20) describing
the competitive equilibrium – that is, we set up the familiar linear-quadratic optimal
policy problem. A correct welfare ranking of alternative policies requires a second-order
approximation of utility that involves no linear terms – at least in expectations (see
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Woodford, 2003a, ch.6).
The existence of a non-zero linear term in the utility approximation crucially relies
on the distortions of the steady state output relative to the efficient output level as con-
sequences of price and wage-setting power, distortionary taxation and trend deflation
that are represented in φ:







If this inefficiency gap is zero or only of first order in φ, the linear term in the second
order approximation vanishes. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) we assume
that the sales tax plays a role of an output subsidy that offsets exactly the steady state
output distortion. Since we assume separability between consumption and real money
balances, this implies that real balance effects do not contribute to this inefficiency
measure.
As Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004) point out, the inclusion of money demand funda-
mentally changes optimal monetary policy responses even in case if one assumes – as
we do – real balances do not effect the dynamic evolution of inflation and output in
the competitive equilibrium. The reason is that variations in the nominal interest rate
contribute to the relevant distortions the policy maker seeks to stabilize. As we will
show below, the relative weight of variations in the interest rate that enters the welfare
measure is substantially increased if we approximate around the optimal steady state.
In the following proposition we derive a quadratic Taylor-series approximation to (21).
Proposition 3 (Quadratic Approximation to Utility) If the fluctuations in yt around
y, Rt around R, ξt around ξ, πt around π are small enough, π and ∆ are close enough
to 1, and if the steady state distortions φ vanish due to the existence of an appropriate
22




βt−t0 [λx(ŷt − ŷ∗t )2 + π̂2t + λRR̂2t ] + t.i.s.p. +O(‖ξ̂t, ς‖3), (23)
where t.i.s.p. indicate terms independent of stabilization policy, κ = (1−α)(1−αβ)(ω+













σgt + (1 + ω)ât
ω + σ
, (26)
where v = y/m > 0.
Proof see appendix 6.7.
Under the conditions given in proposition 3, the relative weights of inflation, output
gap and the nominal interest rates correspond to the results in Woodford (2003a). Our
analysis differs from Woodford (2003a), because the steady state values relate to the
lower bound and no longer to price stability as in his analysis. A crucial feature for the
validity of the quadratic approximation above is that price dispersion in the optimal
deterministic steady state (involving deflation) is not too large. Since the dispersion
measure is lower for deflation than for inflation (see Figure 4 in the appendix) this is
more likely to be fulfilled when the model is approximated around a deflationary steady
state.7
Remarkably, only the weight to stabilize fluctuations in the nominal interest rate
7In addition, we checked the accuracy of the results by comparing them to the optimal solution
implied by the procedure proposed by Khan et al. 2003. We thank Andrew Levin for providing us
with the MATLAB codes that solve the Ramsey problem in Levin et. al. (2005)
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depends on steady state values, v and ηR,FR. Since we approximate our model around
the deterministic steady state consistent with the Friedman Rule, the value for the
former is small and even more importantly the value for the latter is large, implying
a high preference to stabilize variations in the opportunity costs to hold money: For
π → β, this preference becomes even infinitely large. Notably, the dependence of the
stabilization weights on the approximation point is absent in cashless economies: The
weights for inflation (1) and output gap stabilization (κ/θ) do not hinge on steady
state values. To set up the optimal policy problem, we need to rewrite the relevant
constraints, i.e. the Euler-equation, the law of motion for F̂t and the aggregate supply
curve in terms of the welfare-relevant output gap, xt = ŷt − ŷ∗t :
R̂t = π̂t+1 + σ(Etxt+1 − xt) + nt, (27)
F̂t = (1− αβπ̄θ)(1 + ω)xt + ut + αβπ̄θEt(θπ̂t+1 + F̂t+1) (28)
and
π̂t = βEtπ̂t+1 + η4xt +
κ∗(π̄ − 1)
1− αβπ̄θ F̂t + st. (29)
Here, nt, ut, st denote linear combinations of the elements of ξ̂t and η4 is a constant,
which are defined in appendix 6.8. Note, that the money demand condition does not
enter the set of relevant constraints of the policy problem. Nevertheless it influences
the optimal decision via the quadratic loss function, in which it plays an important role
in determining the relative weight of interest rate variations.
24
4 Optimal short-run policy from a timeless perspec-
tive
We are interested in the optimal policy from a timeless perspective (Woodford, 2003a)
in a linear quadratic framework. We showed that the optimal policy in the long run is to
follow the Friedman rule. In this section we consider the implications for optimal policy
in the short run, if deflation – instead of zero inflation – is chosen as the optimal long
target. In particular, we consider the optimal reaction to various kinds of disturbances
and evaluate the resulting stabilization loss of both regimes.
4.1 Optimal response to shocks
This subsection discusses the optimal response to shocks in the economy. We present the
impulse responses under optimal policy under commitment and distinguish two cases.
In the first case, our set of equilibrium conditions is log-linearized around the optimal
steady state in which the inflation rate is equal to β+ε. In the second case, we follow the
conventional procedure and approximate around a steady state of zero inflation. The
choice of a point of expansion for the log-linearization affects both the loss function and
equilibrium conditions. Log-linearizing round the Friedman rule increases the relative
weight on the stabilization of the nominal interest rate and affects the coefficients in
the Phillips curve.
When we log-linearize around the optimal steady state corresponding to the Fried-
man rule, we find that the central bank essentially keeps the nominal interest rate
fixed in response to any of the shocks present in our model. Consider first the optimal
response to a technology shock displayed in Figure 2.
A Taylor expansion around zero inflation suggests that central bank should lower
the annualized nominal rate by roughly 12 basis points and then gradually return to
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Figure 2: Responses to technology shock
the steady state. However, linearization around the Friedman rule implies that the
nominal rate is literally fixed. In line with this finding, the approximation around
the Friedman rule implies more volatile response of inflation and the output gap than
what is suggested by linearization around the zero inflation steady state. A stronger
stabilization of the nominal interest rate necessarily implies that the other arguments
in the loss function can only be stabilized less.
Impulse responses to the other shocks deliver a similar message: Linearization
around the Friedman steady state implies that the nominal interest rate is literally fixed.
Inflation and output gap fluctuate by more than when the linearization is performed
around the zero inflation steady state. The reason for why the interest rate does not
respond under optimal policy is that stabilization of the interest rate is the main prin-
ciple (see Table 2). Intuitively, the interest elasticity of money demand, [σm(R− 1)]−1
becomes very large as R approaches its lower bound. For our baseline calibration this
elasticity is roughly -4000 at R = 1 + ε. Despite the fact that the marginal utility of
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Figure 3: Responses to wage markup shock
real balances is close to zero (such that v is small), this large elasticity explains why
the central bank wishes to hold the nominal rate constant under the Friedman rule.
4.2 Welfare Analysis
In this subsection we compare the welfare implications of the two policy regimes –
the long run deflation target according to the Friedman rule vs. zero inflation as the
long run target. Using (23) a second-order accurate approximation to the utility of the





1− β Ū − ΩEt0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0λx(ŷt − ŷ∗t )2 + π̂2t + λRR̂2t . (30)
The first part, the discounted steady state utility, is shown to be higher if the Friedman
rule is optimal. The second part, the stabilization loss, that relates to the optimal policy
reaction in the short run, is not necessarily lower under the Friedman rule regime than
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under zero inflation. Which of those two parts dominates depends on the calibration of
the model, e.g. increasing the variances of the innovations amplifies the welfare loss due
to short run fluctuations. In line with the spirit of the timeless perspective, we do not
compute welfare conditional on a particular initial state vector at time t0. Our short
run stabilization loss is given by the discounted and weighted sum of unconditional
variances:
SL = − 1
1− βΩ{var(π̂) + λxvar(x) + λRvar(R̂)} = −
1
1− βΩL, (31)
Here L is proportional to the unconditional expectation of period utility. In table
2 below we list the relative loss differences under the two policy regimes for a range
of relative weights for the utility of real money balances given our baseline calibration
for other parameters. For this purpose we calibrate the stochastic shock processes to
match the standard deviations of real private consumption and government spending
of U.S. data during the post-Volcker period.8 All exogenous processes are assumed
to be autocorrelated with coefficient 0.9. We have chosen a standard deviation of
the innovations to the taste shock of 0.0001, for the markup shock 0.00015, for the
government spending shock 0.0075 and for the technology shock 0.0096.
8The quarterly data is logged and detrended via the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing
parameter of 10,000. The obtained standard deviation of private consumption is 0.0123, for government






R 100 ∗ (LZERO − LFR)/LFR 100 ∗ dU/U σFR σZERO
1/20 2.3426 1472 32.40 0.75 317 41
1/50 1.6238 1020 20.36 0.49 220 31
1/99 1.2355 777 10.24 0.35 167 25
1/150 1.0463 658 3.72 0.28 142 23
1/189 0.9539 600 0.00 0.25 129 21
1/250 0.8530 536 −4.55 0.21 116 20
1/500 0.6464 406 −15.97 0.14 88 17
1/1000 0.4899 308 −27.24 0.08 66 15
Table 2: Welfare Analysis: ε = 0.0001
The results in Table 2 reveal that the larger the preference parameter of the house-
holds’ for the Friedman rule steady state a1 the larger is the willingness of the central
bank to stabilize the nominal interest rate λFRR . This implies that optimal long run and
short run monetary policy are closely interrelated in case of a transaction friction9.
The resulting stabilization loss, when approximating around the Friedman rule
steady state LFR is superior to the stabilization loss around zero inflation LZERO if
a1 is large enough. The (technical) intuition for this is a trade off effect between pre-
dictability and possible welfare losses in the neighborhood of the steady state of each
regime. If the Friedman rule is the expansion point, then the reduced form involves 4
jump variables, R̂t, xt, π̂t and F̂t, as well as 3 endogenous state variables, the multipliers
on the relevant constraints, (27)-(29). If zero inflation is chosen as the approximation
point, the reduced form does not involve F̂t and exhibits only the two multipliers as-
sociated with the aggregate supply curve and the euler equation as endogenous state
variables. On the one hand, the state space is increased in the Friedman regime, im-
plying higher prediction power by reducing the error variances of inflation, output gap
and the nominal interest rate.10 On the other hand, however, possible welfare losses
9Table 3 in the appendix gives the corresponding results for ε = .000001, i.e. if the assumed lower
bound is closer to the zero bound.
10Note however, that the models are not structurally nested, since in the Friedman regime more
29
in the neighborhood of the zero inflation steady state are lower, steady state utility is
”flatter” around π = 1 (see Figure 1). If the relative weight of real money balances
decreases, the additional state variable loses prediction power, while possible welfare
losses around the zero inflation steady state decrease. Intuitively, the prediction effect
is larger, if the endogenous state variables carry the main relevant information from
previous periods, i.e. if the disturbances are only weakly autocorrelated. While there
is a cut-off value in terms of stabilization loss, overall utility composed of steady state
utility minus stabilization loss, is higher under the Friedman rule than under zero in-
flation though the relative differences are small. The second but last column of Table
2 depicts this overall difference in utility under the Friedman regime minus the zero
inflation regime expressed as percentages.
The entries σFR and σZERO shed light on how likely it is that the lower bound on
the nominal interest rate binds if the economy fluctuates around the Friedman rule
ε steady state or around price stability. We calculate the standard deviation of the
nominal interest rate under the optimal policy implied by both policy regimes. The
term σFR then expresses the size of the interval from R = 1.0001 to the lower bound
R = 1 in terms of this standard deviation. The entry σZERO also expresses this interval
in terms of standard deviations of the nominal rate, but now the approximation is
computed around a zero inflation steady state. Hence, larger values for σFR or for
σZERO imply that the lower bound is less likely to be binding. Note that our results
imply a low probability that the nominal interest rate hits the lower bound, i.e. Rt = 1.
Even for a small relative weight of real money balances, a1 = 1/1000, the resulting
standard deviation for the nominal interest rate is small relative to ε, such that a
symmetric confidence interval around R = 1.0001 of up to 66 standard deviations could
be constructed until the lower bound is included. If we decrease ε, i.e. if the assumed
jump variables must be pinned down.
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lower bound moves closer to zero, the corresponding number of standard deviations
increases to 418 (see table 3 in the appendix). This implies that the effect to stabilize
the nominal interest even more (higher relative weight λFRR ) dominates the effect of
the smaller distance to the zero bound. Correspondingly, if zero inflation is chosen as
the expansion point, the probability to hit the lower bound is even higher (see the last
column).
5 Conclusion
We study optimal monetary policy in an economy without capital, where firms set
prices in a staggered way without indexation and real money balances are assumed
to provide utility. Accounting for a sizeable degree of nominal rigidity, the optimal
deterministic steady state from a timeless perspective is to follow the Friedman rule,
even if the importance assigned to the utility of money is small relative to consumption
and leisure.
We approximate the model around the optimal steady state under commitment
as the long-run policy target and derive a second order approximation to households’
utility. Optimal interest rate policy is shown to abstain from reacting sharply to changes
in the state of the economy. Instead of stabilizing inflation, the primary goal of the
central bank is to stabilize fluctuations in the nominal interest rate. In that light,
the well observed tendency of central banks to keep the main refinancing instrument
literally fixed over a long time can be interpreted as optimal behavior according to
Friedman’s rule, even if the state of the economy has changed. Since optimal policy
stabilizes fluctuations in interest to a large amount, the lower bound on the nominal
interest rate is unlikely to be binding.
We stress that our model is not about direct and quantitative advice on optimal
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monetary policy. It is too stylized for this purpose. The foremost contribution of this
paper is to challenge the conventional view that the Friedman rule loses out to the
goal of price stability once price stickiness is introduced. We show that the widely
used money-in-the utility function model implies that the Friedman rule is optimal
even when large amounts of price stickiness are present. When the economy fluctuates
around the Friedman rule steady state, central bankers should keep the nominal interest
stable over the business cycle. This result is explained by the large interest elasticity
of money demand that obtains in the MIU model when the nominal rate is close to
zero. There is little empirical evidence on the behavior of money demand in the major
industrialized countries for very low interest rates. This is unfortunate as the interest
elasticity at low interest rates is a key difference between our MIU framework and
the transactions technology employed in other papers that come to different policy
prescriptions. Hence, future research on optimal policy in sticky price models benefits
from a better understanding of money demand in such low interest rate environments.
6 Appendix
6.1 The optimal deterministic state from a timeless perspec-
tive
The standard commitment approach would be to choose state contingent path for
∆t, Rt, πt and yt for each t ≥ t0, to maximize (8) for a given degree of initial price
dispersion an initial nominal interest rate. Without any precommitment, this approach
would suffer of time inconsistency. Woodford (2003) proposes a certain degree of initial
commitment, to bring about the optimal equilibrium. In our case, we need to assume,
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that Ft0 = F , Kt0 = K and yt0 = y ,i.e. the initial values for these variables are identical
their optimal steady state values. The optimal deterministic steady state is a solution
to the problem defined in the text, that involves constant values for all variables and
each of the disturbances identical to their means. Basically we are looking for an initial
degree of price dispersion ∆t0−1 and an initial interest rate Rt0−1, and precommitment
Ft0 = F , Kt0 = K and yt0 = y, such that Rt = R, πt = π, Ft = F , Kt = K, yt = y, for
each period, and ∆, R are equal to the initial price dispersion an the initial nominal
interest rate. Using the time-invariant form for the Lagrangian, the first order necessary
conditions with respect to yt, ∆t, Kt, Ft, Rt and πt for all t ≥ t0 are given by:
uc(t)−∆tvl(t) + zm(t)mc(t) + λ2t(1− τ)[ucc(t)yt + uc(t)]
+λ3tµ
w





−ytvl(t) + λ3tvll(t)y2t µwt + λ4t − λ4t+1βαπθt+1 .= 0 (33)
λ1tρ(t)
1
1−θ − [λ2t − απθ−1t λ2t−1] .= 0 (34)
− θ



























Note that λ2t0−1, λ3t0 and λ5t0−1 are the multipliers associated with the initial commit-
ment.
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6.2 Description of the numerical procedure to calculate the
optimal steady state
We solved for the optimal deterministic steady state numerically. Thereby we used the
specific CRRA utility function given in the text.
The procedure works in the following way: We solve for y, R, F , K and ∆ each as
a function of steady state inflation exclusively – using the constraints (9)-(13). That is,
for a given inflation rate, the values for the other variables are given by these functions.
To check for the robustness of out results, we use two different procedures: The first
one involves the exploitation of the first order conditions, the second one the direct
evaluation of utility in the steady state.11
The first procedure is applied in the program stcommit.m. We use the values given
by the constraints and solve for the lagrangian multipliers λ1-λ5 uniquely by exploiting
the 5 first order conditions for output, interest, dispersion, F and K. Then we use these
values and substitute them in the first order condition for inflation, fc(π), to check for
optimality of the given inflation rate. Thereby several cases are possible. For example,
if this condition is globally negative (positive) over the grid of steady state inflation
rates, then the optimal inflation is the lower (upper) bound. If however, the first order
condition crosses the zero line, the optimum can be an interior solution. Suppose that
fc(π) is positive at the lower bound, monotonically decreasing and crosses the inflation
axis at some inflation rate, π1 ∈ (β + ε, upper bound). Then π1 is the optimal inflation.
If instead, fc is negative at the lower bound, monotonically increasing and crosses the
zero value for π2, then π2 can’t be the optimum – either the lower bound or the upper
bound is the optimum. Obviously – in principle – several cases are possible and even
multiple solutions can arise. Once, the optimal inflation rate is found, the values for
11The MATLAB programs to compute the optimal steady state, and the Toolkit code to calculate
the IRFs and the results in table 2 are available on request.
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the variables and the lagrangian multipliers are implied by the constraints or the first
order conditions.
The program ssrand31.m uses a direct evaluation of steady state utility by substi-
tuting for each given inflation rate, the values of output, interest, F , K and dispersion
into the utility function. Afterwards one maximizes over the resulting utility function
and picks the optimal inflation rate and the optimal values for the variables are implied
by the constraints of the optimal policy problem.
6.3 Constraints and CRRA preferences in the steady state
Suppose that the utility function is of the CRRA form. Given an output subsidy that
renders the steady state efficient, constraints (9)-(13), and the money demand equation
can be combined to solve for ∆, y, c, l, R and m in terms of inflation.
∆ =
(1− α)ρ θθ−1
1− απθ , (38)







c = ysc, (40)





m = [R/(R− 1)yσca1scσc ]1/σm . (43)
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6.4 Proof proposition 1
Consider first the steady state utility if the inflation rate is zero. Correspondingly,
gross inflation and price dispersion are 1, such that yZERO = lZERO. Using (39)-
(43), one can compute yZERO = 1/sc
1/(1+ω) = lZERO, cZERO = sc
ω/(1+ω) and mZERO =
RZEROηR,ZEROa1sc
ω/(1+ω). Then the period steady state utility of the average household
is given by





− a1 ln(1− β) + a1 ln(a1). (44)




yZERO, while lFR = (∆FR/sc)
1/(1+ω) > lZERO. Consumption and real money balances
are then given by cFR = (sc/∆FR)
ω/(1+ω) < cZERO and mFR = RFRηR,FRa1(sc/∆FR)
ω/(1+ω) >













Comparing (44) and (45), the Friedman rule yields higher utility as long as a1 > a1. ¥
6.5 Proof proposition 2
This proof is per contradiction. If the Friedman rule is optimal, then necessarily (16)
must be non-positive. Under the assumed CRRA preferences, real money balances in
the deterministic steady state are given by (43), implying that they converge to infinity
for R → 1, given that a1 and sc are finite and positive. The lagrangian multiplier
λ5 = m/(Rσm) converges to infinity, too, while λ1 under discretion is given by:
λ1 =
uc −∆vl + zmmc − λ5ucc
−ρ1/(1−θ)(1− τ)(uccy + uc) + θ/(θ − 1)µ̄w(vll∆y + vl) .
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This multiplier is positive for λ5 → ∞ and σsc−1 ≥ 1 such that uccy + uc < 0. Since
K = sc−σc(1− τ)y1−σc/[1−αβπθ−1] and ρ = (1−απθ−1)/(1−α) are positive for π < 1,
the first expression in (16) is positive, implying, that the optimality of the Friedman




is positive, since λ3 = −θ/(θ − 1)λ1 < 0. Therefore, in order to qualify the Friedman








⇐⇒ π−1 < (1− απ
θ−1)
(1− απθ)
⇐⇒ π−1 < 1,
which is a contradiction, since π < 1 holds under the Friedman rule. ¥
6.6 Derivation of the aggregate supply curve in case of trend
deflation




= F̂t − K̂t. (47)
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Using the definition of the price level, Pit/Pt = [(1 − απθ−1t )/(1 − α)]1/(1−θ), the left
hand side of (47) can be approximated to first order with
απ̄θ−1
1− απ̄θ−1 π̂t, (48)
while the expression on the right-hand side can be approximated by (using the recursive
form of Ft and Kt):
F̂t = (1− αβπ̄θ)[ ̂uc(yt −Gt, ζt) + ŷt + m̂ct] + αβπ̄θEt(θπ̂t+1 + F̂t+1) (49)
and
K̂t = (1−αβπ̄θ−1)[ ̂uc(yt −Gt, ζt)+ ŷt + ̂(1− τt)]+αβπ̄θ−1Et((θ−1)π̂t+1 + K̂t+1). (50)
Note that under trend deflation αβπ̄ < 1, while convergence has to be assumed, if one
approximates around trend inflation (Ascari, 2004). Therefore the difference F̂t− K̂t is
given by:
F̂t − K̂t = αβπ̄θ−1(π̄ − 1)θEtπ̂t+1 + αβπ̄θ−1Etπ̂t+1 + αβπ̄θ−1Et(π̄F̂t+1 − K̂t+1)
+ αβπ̄θ−1(1− π̄)( ̂uc(yt −Gt, ζt) + ŷt) + (1− αβπ̄θ)m̂ct − (1− αβπ̄θ−1) ̂(1− τt).
Adding and subtracting αβπ̄θ−1EtF̂t+1, then using (47) to substitute for Et(F̂t+1−K̂t+1),
F̂t − K̂t and then for F̂t+1 with (20), results in:




+ κ∗( ̂uc(yt −Gt, ζt) + ŷt) 1− π̄





Using that ̂uc(yt −Gt, ζt) = −σŷt + σgt, and m̂ct = −(1 + ω)ât + σŷt + ωŷt + µ̂wt − σgt,
results in
π̂t = βEtπ̂t+1 + F̂tκ
∗ (π̄ − 1)
1− αβπ̄θ + κ





1− αβπ̄θ − 1] + κ
∗[µ̂wt − (1 + ω)ât + wτ
1− αβπ̄θ−1
1− αβπ̄θ τ̂t].
Applying the definition of ŷnt and making use of τ̂t = 0 in this setting, results in (19)
in the text.
6.7 Proof proposition 3
The period utility function of the average household in equilibrium is given by:
∫ 1
0




To derive (23) we need to impose, that in the optimal steady state real money balances
are sufficiently close to satiation (see Woodford, 2003, Assumption 6.1), the price dis-
persion associated with optimal inflation is sufficiently small, as well as that optimal
inflation is close enough to one.
The first summand can be approximated to second order by:
u(yt −Gt, ζt) = u + uc(yt − y) + 0.5ucc(yt − y)2 + ucG(yt − y)(Gt −G) + ucζ(yt − y)(ζt − ζ)
+ 0.5uGG(Gt −G)2 + 0.5uζζ(ζt − ζ)2 +O(‖ξ̂t, ŷt‖3)
= uc(ŷt + 0.5ŷ
2








ŷ2t + σgtŷt] + t.i.s.p. +O(‖ξ̂t, ŷt‖3), (51)
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where we used that (xt−x) = x(x̂t+0.5x̂2t )+O(‖x̂t‖3), t.i.s.p denotes terms independent
of stabilization policy, ucζ = uc, ζ = 1, σ = σcsc
−1, Ĝt = (Gt − G)/y, and that
gt = Ĝt + σ







(1− σm)m̂2t ] + t.i.s.p. +O(‖m̂t‖3).
Following Woodford (2003a), we treat (R− 1)/R as an expansion parameter, implying
that zm/uc − 0 = (R − 1)/R − 0 is at least of first order. Since we expand our model
at a point near the zero bound, since means, that real money balances are near the
satiation level.
Applying an first order approximation to the money demand equation results in
m̂t = σ/σm(ŷt − gt) − [(R − 1)σm]−1R̂t + O(‖ξ̂t‖2). Therefore, the coefficient σ/σm =
uccy(R− 1)/(Rzmmm) is of first order in (R− 1)/R. Defining sm = zmm/(ucy), which
is of first order in (R− 1)/R, so that smσ/σm is of second order, the approximation of




(ŷt − gt)− R̂t
(R− 1)σm ) + 0.5sm(
σ
σm





(ŷt − gt)− R̂t
(R− 1)σm )
2] + t.i.s.p. +O(‖ξ̂t, ŷt, R̂t‖3)
= ucy[−sm( R̂t






2] + t.i.s.p. +O(‖ξ̂t, ŷt, R̂t‖3)
= −ucy 1
2σm(R− 1)v (R̂t + (R− 1)/R)




t + t.i.s.p. +O(‖ξ̂t, ŷt, R̂t‖3). (52)
In the first step we used that the second term in the first line is of third order. In
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The last step follows, if one takes into account that (R − 1)/R − 0 is of second order,
implying that the linear term drops out in the quadratic approximation. In equilibrium,
each household supplies the identical amount of labor, since not a special type of labor,












) = v(yt, ∆t, at).




) = v + vy(yt − y) + 0.5vyy(yt − y)2 + vy∆(yt − y)(∆t −∆) + vya(yt − y)(at − a)
+ 0.5vaa(at − a)2 + v∆(∆t −∆) + va∆(at − a)(∆t −∆) + 0.5v∆∆(∆t −∆)2 +O(‖ξ̂t, ŷt, ∆̂t‖3).
In accordance with our numerical results we assume that (Pi/P )
−θ = (P̆ /P )−θ − 1 =
O(‖ς‖3). Here P̆ denotes the average long-term individual price and we collect in ς
the distortions of the relative price due to price dispersion in the optimal steady state.
Therefore, a second order approximation of (Pit/Pt)




)−θ = 1 +O(‖ς‖3)− θ(1 +O(‖ξ̂t, ς‖3))p̂it + θ20.5(1 +O(‖ξ̂t, ς‖3))p̂it2 +O(‖p̂it‖3)
= 1− θp̂it + θ20.5p̂it2 +O(‖p̂it, ξ̂t, ς‖3).
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Integrating this expression across all firms leads to
∆t = 1− θEip̂it + θ2Eip̂2it.




2. Using this the dispersion measure can be written as:
∆t = 1 +
θ
2
vari ln(Pit) +O(‖p̂it, ξ̂t, ς‖3), (53)
and is of second order. That implies, since ∆t−∆ = ∆t−1+O(‖ς‖3) = ∆∆̂t+O(‖∆̂2t‖),
that ∆̂t is of second order, too. It follows that the second order approximation of v(lt)
can be rewritten as:
v(lt) = vyy[ŷt +
1 + ω
2
ŷ2t − (1 + ω)âtŷt + ∆̂t] + t.i.s.p. +O(‖ξ̂t, ŷt, ∆̂0.5t , ς‖3), (54)
vyy = v∆∆ = vll. Note that we can connect (51),(52) and (54) by the relationship
vy/uc = amc/µ
w = (1− φ), with





U(ct, lt,mt) = −ucy[−φŷt + σ + ω − φ(1 + ω)
2







t ] + t.i.s.p. +O(‖ξ̂t, ς‖3)
Using the sales tax as a sales subsidy by setting






, the linear term in the welfare approximation above vanishes, so that we get indeed a
welfare measure accurate to second order of the true non-linear optimal solution using
only linear approximations to the model’s structural equations (Woodford, 2003):
U(t) = −ucy
2
[(σ + ω)(ŷt − σgt + (1 + ω)ât
σ + ω
)2 + θvari ln(Pit) +
R̂2t








t ] + t.i.s.p. +O(‖ξ̂t, ς‖3). (55)
The variance of ln(Pt(i)) follows:






= αvari ln(Pit−1) +
α
1− α [ln(πt)− ln(π)][π̂t + 2 ln(π)] + t.i.s.p. +O(‖ξ̂t‖
3)




t + 2 ln(π)π̂t] + t.i.s.p. +O(‖ξ̂t‖3)




t + t.i.s.p. +O(‖ξ̂t, ς2/3‖3),
where we assumed that ln(π) = 0 + O(‖ς‖2). Iterating the equation above forward









s + t.i.s.p. +O(‖ξ̂t, ς2/3‖3),
where we used that the initial price dispersion vari ln(Pit0−1) is t.i.s.p.








βt−t0 π̂2t + t.i.s.p. +O(‖ξ̂t, ς‖3).
Applying this result to (55) gives (23) in proposition 3.
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6.8 Definition of the disturbances nt, ut and st
The exogenous fluctuations are defines as:
nt = η2Et(ât+1 − ât)− η1σEt(gt+1 − gt),
ut = η3ât + (1− αβπ̄θ)µ̂wt + η3σgt
and
st = η5ât + η6σgt + κ
∗µ̂wt .


























1− αβπ̄θ − 1).
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Additional figures and tables




















Figure 4: Steady state price dispersion as a function of inflation.


























Figure 5: Optimal annual inflation and Calvo parameter α. The vertical line denotes







R 100 ∗ (LZERO − LFR)/LFR 100 ∗ dU/U σ(FR) σ(ZERO)
1/20 2.3426 928920 32.29 0.80 1999 41
1/50 1.6238 643870 20.25 0.53 1386 31
1/99 1.2355 488930 10.12 0.38 1054 25
1/150 1.0463 414910 3.60 0.27 893 23
1/189 0.9539 378270 −0.12 0.23 814 21
1/250 0.8530 338230 −4.68 0.15 728 20
1/500 0.6464 256330 −16.10 0.09 552 17
1/1000 0.4899 19460 −27.38 0.02 418 15
Table 3: Welfare Analysis: ε = 0.000001
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